U.S. Political Warfare Policy

Table of Contents

I. Purpose and Scope.................................................................1

II. Background.................................................................................1
   A. The Pattern..............................................................................1
   B. The Factors............................................................................3
   C. Objectives...............................................................................4
   D. Lessons..................................................................................4

III. Approaches to Political Warfare.............................................4
   A. Chinese Three Warfares.......................................................5
   B. Three Principles of Iranian Unconventional Warfare.............5
   C. Russian Unconventional Warfare.........................................5
   D. U.S.-Sponsored Insurgency.................................................7
   E. Comparison.............................................................................8

IV. Framework of U.S. Political Warfare Policy.............................8
   A. U.S. Political Warfare Purpose and Objective.......................8
   B. U.S. Interests..........................................................................8
   C. U.S. Political Warfare Role...................................................9

V. The U.S. Strategy........................................................................10
   A. Selective................................................................................11
   B. Multilateral............................................................................11
   C. Understanding the Operational Environment.......................12
   D. Actions in the Operational Environment...............................19

VI. Application of U.S. Strategy....................................................20
   A. Concept of Operations..........................................................20
      1. Intelligence.........................................................................21
      2. Influence............................................................................21
      3. Stages of Political Warfare.................................................22
      4. Washington........................................................................24
      5. Abroad...............................................................................26
   B. Roles and Missions...............................................................27
      1. The Role of the Department of State....................................27
      2. The Role of the Agency for International Development.........29
      3. The Role of the Department of Defense...............................31
      4. The Role of the Department of Treasury.............................33
      5. The Role of the Central Intelligence Agency.........................33

Annex A: Glossary of Terms.........................................................35

Annex B: Model Outline of Political Warfare Plan.........................39

(This Document was prepared by an Interdepartmental Committee consisting of Representatives of DOS (Chair), DOD, DOT, CIA, and AID and approved as policy by Presidential Directive xxx of dd mm yy.) [Drafted by D. Robert Worley, modeled on the Overseas Internal Defense Policy of 1962, incorporating material provided by the Kennan Donovan Initiative at Georgetown University.]
U.S. POLITICAL WARFARE POLICY

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

A. A most pressing U.S. national security problem now, and for the foreseeable future, is the ongoing aggressive competition for dominion over territory, resources, and people in the space between peace and war—political warfare. Many years of experience with the techniques of subversion and insurgency have provided opportunists with a comprehensive, tested doctrine for conquest, and new forms of political warfare have emerged in the twenty-first century. Our task is to fashion on an urgent basis an effective plan of action to combat this critical threat to international stability, using all instruments of national power short of war.

B. It is the purpose of this document to provide the responsible executive agencies of the U.S. Government (DOS, DOD, DOT, AID, and CIA) with policy guidance for the employment of U.S. resources to wage political warfare and to assist in the development of balanced capabilities for the competition over sovereign territory and U.S. access to global resources.

C. This document is concerned with (1) hostile parties gaining dominion over territory and its people and resources and (2) other types of resistance, revolution, subversion, secession, and insurgency which are inimical to U.S. national security interests in all countries of the world whether or not they are allies.

D. The scope of this document embraces the range of U.S. measures to wage political warfare described in (1) and (2) above. The tactical employment of U.S. Armed Forces in combat operations in direct support of governments under insurgent military attack—counterinsurgency or foreign internal defense—is beyond the scope of this document.

II. BACKGROUND

A. THE PATTERN

There is nothing new about political warfare. There is a long history of colonial powers gaining dominion over territory, people, and resources in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Middle East, the Indian Subcontinent, and the Far East. Many of these acquisitions were motivated by economic interests and were made without overt military invasion. During the Second World War, a component of U.S. strategy
was assisting resistance forces in Europe against the occupying German power and in Asia against the occupying Japanese power. And in the period spanning the two world wars, political warfare waged by the Diaspora successfully established a Jewish state in Arab Palestine.

Throughout the Cold War the Soviet Union waged political warfare by encouraging and exploiting indigenous conditions. The object was not to acquire territory directly but to spread a form of government and economy thought amenable to Soviet interests. It supported warfare by proxy against South Korea and South Vietnam. In contrast, the United States fought directly at great cost. Thus, the Soviet’s political warfare was an economy of force and part of a cost-imposing strategy against the United States.

After opposing a modernizing, socialist government, indigenous Afghan forces waged a successful insurgency against occupying Soviet forces from 1979 to 1989. Simultaneously, external powers waged political warfare over the contested area. Iran supported the Northern Alliance including Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia supported Pashtuns in the south with U.S. support.

More recently, there is little question that regional powers – like China, Russia, and Iran – are waging political warfare along their peripheries. Each has evolved its own distinct method of waging political warfare.

1. Russia acquired Crimea and its critical port facilities yielding military and commercial advantage. It then waged a successful campaign to acquire dominion over a large swath of Ukraine all the while using energy policy to hold the European powers at bay.

2. China is making territorial claims in the Pacific and making economic inroads into Africa.

3. Islamist forces have attempted to take control in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Egypt, Lebanon, and elsewhere while their external sponsors – in some cases Sunni Gulf States and individuals, and in other cases Iran and Shia sympathizers – waged political warfare over the contested area.

Whereas in some countries the vulnerability may not be apparent, the evidence is clear that we face continuing and growing disintegrative instability. Maintaining
geopolitical advantage depends on identifying and understanding the nature of the competition over contested territory and competing with properly balanced action.

B. THE FACTORS

1. During the Cold War, the employment of indirect aggression through the use of subversion and insurgency against Free World institutions was related directly to the fact that the world was dominated by strong centers of power in the East and West. These power centers tended to have interests in most of the critical situations that occurred throughout the world. They tended at the same time to muffle any violent confrontation so as to avoid escalation to the nuclear level. On the part of Chinese and Soviet communists, this resulted in an increased effort to seek their objectives by subversive insurgency rather than overt aggression. But without the Cold War’s bipolar constraints, middle powers and non-state actors now have greater freedom of action to pursue their policy objectives in similar fashion.

2. External power centers have a means of reaching into other societies and influencing favorably disposed groups. Conflicting groups in at-risk countries are thus able to enlist the support of one or more external powers. The ideological confrontation thus favors and intensifies internal conflict in subject countries.

3. States with transitional social patterns and weak institutions are vulnerable. They are often a legacy of shapeless, frequently illogical political units which are derived, in part, from a colonial past. The disturbance of man’s mind and environment caused by the World Wars, the colonial era, and the Cold War still lingers on. These characteristics act to diminish respect for public order, and encourage initiatives which easily cross the line into disorder and violence. These vulnerable states include many in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and the states of the former Soviet Union. Other states with cohesive social patterns and mature institutions may also be vulnerable simply because they are weaker than potential aggressors, for example, the Baltic States.

4. Intensifying and exaggerating these factors, and sweeping on with a momentum of its own, a social and economic revolution of great force has been spreading
throughout much of the world - globalization, urbanization, and modernization. Purposefully or otherwise societies are gearing themselves to higher levels of economic and social activity. The necessary substructures inevitably cut into traditions and habits fostered by rural isolation. Rural people crowd into the strange environment of cities that lack for them a satisfactory pattern of living. Social action, like land reform, manifestly alters accustomed social and often political relationships. These are but examples of the manifold ways in which the revolution of modernization can disturb, uproot, and daze a traditional society. While the institutions required for modernization are in process of being created, this revolution contributes to arousing pressures, anxieties, and hopes which seem to justify violent action.

C. OBJECTIVES

Throughout the Cold War, political warfare was waged to spread ideology rather than acquire territory. Dominion, nonetheless, was the objective. More recently Russia and China compete for global resources and geopolitical position, including acquisition of territory. But territorial acquisition was a means to an end. The pursuit of territory was a pursuit for economic power. More like the Cold War spread of ideology, the Islamic world is involved in a competition between Shia and Sunni Islam with Iran and Saudi Arabia representing the two power centers, with others in support.

D. LESSONS

Success in political warfare is not guaranteed, but the United States is not effectively entering into the competition. The transition directly from peace to war follows from failing at political warfare in between.

III. APPROACHES TO POLITICAL WARFARE

Political warfare, or unconventional statecraft, is waged by state and non-state actors. Political warfare includes both unconventional warfare and counter-unconventional warfare. Every attempt at political warfare is unique, but several broad approaches are apparent post Cold War, including those of China, Russia, Iran, and the United States.
A. CHINESE THREE WARFARES

Psychological Warfare seeks to disrupt an opponent’s decision-making capacity; create doubts, foment anti-leadership sentiments, deceive, and diminish the will to fight among opponents.

Legal Warfare ("lawfare") can involve enacting domestic law as the basis for making claims in international law and employing revisionist maps to justify China’s actions.

Media Warfare is the key to gaining dominance over the venue for implementing psychological and legal warfare.

B. THREE PRINCIPLES OF IRANIAN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Principle I: Leave a light footprint. Iran’s preference for a light footprint, especially covert operations, has been confirmed on numerous occasions since 1979; for example, Iran’s Quds Forces functions as a special operations group to improve indigenous force performance. This preference, shaped by Iran’s experiences in the 1980s, coalesced into a more consistent approach in the aftermath of the killing of 13 Iranian diplomats in its Mazari Sharif consulate by the Afghan Taliban in 1998.

Principle II: Partner with indigenous forces and use unconventional warfare. Iran has historically emphasized partnering with indigenous forces in carrying out its military interventions. While reliable publicly available information remains scant, these partnerships appear to follow a basic pattern epitomized by Hezbollah, though there can be important variations from case to case.

Principle III: Create broad non-sectarian coalitions. In its military interventions, Iran has tried to legitimate its actions and weaken its opponents by creating broad non-sectarian coalitions, meaning that it often seeks to avoid overt sectarianism both in its discourse and actions, where feasible.

C. RUSSIAN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Phase I: Setup. The first phase involves non-military asymmetric warfare encompassing informational, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures as part of a plan to establish a favorable political, economic, and military setup.

Phase II: Mislead and Deceive. The second phase involves special operations to mislead political and
military leaders by coordinated measures carried out by diplomatic channels, media, and top government and military agencies by leaking false data, orders, directives, and instructions.

Phase III: Corrupt Officials. The third phase includes intimidating, deceiving, and bribing government and military officers, with the objective of making them abandon their official duties.

Phase IV: Escalate Subversion. The fourth phase involves dissemination of destabilizing propaganda to increase discontent among the population, boosted by the arrival of Russian bands of militants, and escalating subversion.

Phase V: Isolate the Subject. The fifth phase involves establishment of no-fly zones over the country to be attacked, imposition of blockades, and extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with armed opposition units.

Phase VI: Broad Spectrum Military Operations. The sixth phase involves the commencement of military action, immediately preceded by large-scale reconnaissance and subversive missions. All types, forms, methods, and forces, including special operations forces, space, radio, radio engineering, electronic, diplomatic, and secret service intelligence, and industrial espionage are employed.

Phase VII: Focused Operations. The seventh phase involves targeted information operations, electronic warfare operations, aerospace operations, and continuous air force harassment, combined with the use of precision weapons launched from various platforms (long-range artillery, weapons based on new physical principles, including microwave, radiation, and non-lethal biological weapons).

Phase VIII: Mopping Up. The eighth phase involves rolling over the remaining points of resistance and destroying surviving enemy units by special operations conducted by reconnaissance units to spot which enemy units have survived and transmit their coordinates to the attacker’s missile and artillery units; fire barrages to annihilate the defender’s resisting army units by effective advanced weapons; airdrop operations to surround points of resistance; and territory mopping-up operations by ground troops.
D. U.S.-SPONSORED INSURGENCY

Phase I: Preparation. The preparation phase for unconventional warfare begins with the approval of the president or secretary of defense to execute an unconventional warfare campaign. Intelligence and psychological preparation continues throughout.

Phase II: Initial Contact. Ideally, a pilot team makes initial contact with an established or potential irregular element. A pilot team is typically an ad hoc element composed of individuals possessing the specialized skills appropriate to the particular mission.

Phase III: Infiltration. During this phase, special operations forces infiltrate the unconventional warfare operating area. Infiltration may be as overt as using a chartered civilian flight or as discreet as a clandestine insertion.

Phase IV: Organization. Once U.S. advisors link up with resistance leadership, the objective is to determine and agree upon a plan to organize the resistance for expanded operations. In addition to physical preparations, this entails a confirmation of mutual objectives and prior agreements. This requires a period of rapport-building to develop trust and confidence, as well as a period of discussion of expectations from both sides.

Phase V: Buildup. Plans agreed to in Phase IV are implemented in Phase V. The amount of effort required to conduct organization building will be based on the insurgent or resistance organization that may already exist. Organization could be time consuming and painstaking or friendly forces could fall in on well-established and robust organizations.

Phase VI: Employment. This will be a series of many events, both lethal and nonlethal, throughout Phases IV through VII. In other words, Phase V does not come to a complete stop when Phase VI begins. Nevertheless, this may represent a planned surge or maximum growth of organization effectiveness synchronized with planned future operations.

Phase VII: Transition. When unconventional warfare ends in overthrow of a state or liberation of occupied territory and leads to a new government, Phase VII will include those activities contributing to the promotion of the new government’s legitimacy. In such cases, the unconventional warfare effort will transition to foreign internal defense at some point.
E. COMPARISON

A comparison of the various approaches to unconventional warfare brings differences into stark relief. The U.S. approach to unconventional warfare is very tactical, limited, and focused on special operations forces. Russian unconventional warfare is strategic and employs diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments and conventional as well as special operations forces. The Russian approach also applies broader tasks, e.g., no fly zones, blockades, electronic warfare, deception, and propaganda. Chinese and Iranian thinking is still broader and employs a wider range of instruments. A broader U.S. framework is necessary.

IV. FRAMEWORK OF U.S. POLITICAL WARFARE POLICY

A. U.S. POLITICAL WARFARE PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE

The overall U.S. purpose in the field of political warfare is to maintain an advantageous position on the world stage without resorting to defensive or offensive war by countering aggressors’ attempts to gain advantage over subject states or by subverting the government of a subject state whose actions are inimical to U.S. interests.

The U.S. political warfare objective is to isolate, erode, manipulate, exhaust, wear down, attrit, overthrow, reduce, replace, or create the conditions to coerce a belligerent government or regime to acquiesce to our national objectives, without going to war.

B. U.S. INTERESTS

The broad U.S. interests in vulnerable states are as follows:

1. A political and ideological interest in assuring that vulnerable states evolve in a way that affords a congenial world environment for international cooperation and the growth of representative institutions.

2. A military interest in assuring that strategic areas and the manpower and natural resources of vulnerable states do not fall under hostile control; that these states remain able to maintain effectively their internal security and to preserve independence from external control.
3. An economic interest in assuring that the resources and markets of vulnerable states remain available to us and to other economically developed countries, that is, integration into an increasingly globalized economy.

4. A humanitarian interest in assuring that the achievement of the social, economic, and educational aspirations of vulnerable nations are not being disrupted by outside influence.

C. U.S. POLITICAL WARFARE ROLE

In political warfare, the United States enters into a competition with an opposing power over contested territory – the subject. The subject may be an entire state or, more commonly, a border adjustment involving only a part of a state. The United States may play the role of either status quo power or revisionist power. Other interested external powers may enter into the competition.

When the United States is in the role of status quo power it opposes the aggressor in the competition over the subject territory. Direct military intervention, counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense are methods used to assist the subject state in defending against an insurgent force whether it is an indigenous effort or a proxy force assisted by an outside aggressor. In this situation, the aggressor is waging unconventional warfare while the United States is waging counter-unconventional warfare.

When the United States is the revisionist power, it intervenes against the established government of the subject state perhaps using foreign proxies. In this situation, the United States is waging unconventional warfare and may be opposed by other external powers waging counter-unconventional warfare.

In both cases, the United States is engaged in a strategic competition with other external powers and a more tactical competition involving proxy forces including the forces of the subject state’s established government.

All instruments of national power are employed in a coordinated mix of overt, clandestine, and covert actions. The resources in the subject state and those of interested external actors are marshaled to reduce costs to the United States and to raise costs to the opposing power.
To these ends, the U.S. role is:

1. To conduct a propaganda campaign to expose and discredit the opposition and to advocate the U.S. position.

2. To conduct an overt diplomatic effort to mobilize international support for the U.S. position.

3. To assist indigenous resistance forces opposing an outside or occupying power where that power represents a threat to U.S. interests.

4. To assist opposition forces to conduct effective operations against a state whose actions are inimical to U.S. interests, including infiltration and exfiltration, sabotage, strikes and raids, and false flags.

5. To conduct covert efforts to undermine the opposition’s capabilities.

6. To apply economic measures working against the opposition.

7. To minimize the likelihood of direct U.S. military involvement in the overthrow of a regime or the defense of a state against external aggression by utilizing all instruments of power and by drawing on, as appropriate, the assistance of third countries and international organizations.

8. To minimize the risk of escalation (without deferring to this risk) from political warfare to civil, conventional, or nuclear war.

Assisting proxy forces, as in 3 and 4 above, may include organizing, training, and equipping as well as advising. In some cases, it may include direct action.

V. THE U.S. STRATEGY

It is vital that the CIA, integrating across the intelligence community, identifies threats and opportunities as they emerge. In addition, U.S. Country Teams will continually assess, on the basis of sound intelligence, destabilizing international developments. Early warning will allow ample opportunity for the U.S. Government to determine what position it should take.

When subversion can be anticipated, the issue should be raised to the National Security Council for consideration of remedial action, including political
warfare, before a real crisis limits the alternatives and makes the use of military force imperative.

It is therefore essential that U.S. Country Teams know where the points of strength and vulnerability lie in their respective countries. This done, they can determine how to leverage those elements which most effectively support U.S. objectives.

A. **SELECTIVE**

In line with international law, the United States opposes territorial acquisition by force, but the U.S. does not wish to assume a stance against all regime change and border movement. Where state borders are not aligned with nations, adjustment may produce a more equitable and stable system. Moreover, change brought about through force may be preferable to prolonged deterioration of governmental effectiveness or to a continuation of a situation where increasing discontent and repression interact, thus building toward a more dangerous climax.

Each case of latent, incipient, or active subversion must therefore be examined on its merits in the light of U.S. interests. Competitors seeking advantage where weakness and instability exist may or may not constitute a competition that the U.S. wishes to enter. The decision on where, when, and how to intervene depends on the subject state’s vulnerability, the U.S. interests at risk, the cost of intervention, and the likelihood of success.

B. **MULTILATERAL**

In political warfare, multilateral actions are always preferable to unilateral U.S. action. Political warfare leverages the resources of other state and non-state actors to achieve U.S. objectives.

It is the policy of the U.S. whenever it is in the national interest to:

(a) Take such action in and through the United Nations, NATO, and other multilateral and regional organizations as appropriate.

(b) Encourage, as appropriate, other states to give diplomatic, political, economic, and where necessary, military support to the effort.

(c) Encourage, where feasible and desirable, the former metropoles, to assume major responsibility for assisting their former wards.
(d) In countries contiguous to those under attack, encourage the maintenance of effective border security to prevent use of their territory as an operating base, sanctuary, or transit zone by forces opposed to U.S. objectives.

C. UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Success in political warfare will depend on accurate information, a careful evaluation thereof, and on a unified concept of operations based on a comprehensive plan tailored to the local situation in which civil and military measures interact and reinforce each other.

Strategy must compete with strategy. Before formulating the U.S. strategy, the interests, objectives, and strategies of the competing actors must be understood. Tactical actions may be taken in support but cannot replace sound strategy.

Strategy formulation begins with a characterization of the prevailing conditions relevant to the involved parties, including the subject, aggressors, defenders, and other interested actors. These may be state or non-state actors, and the relevant conditions may differ accordingly.

The initial characterization should identify pressure points that can be acted on. Identifying the center of gravity - the point at which all effort should be directed - is the priority. In political warfare, the center of gravity is more likely the actor’s critical vulnerability rather than its strength.

a. PREVAILING CONDITIONS FOR STATE ACTORS:

Political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure variables provide a starting point for characterizing the various state actors involved in the operational environment.

Political. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance – formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or shadow political powers. The strategist seeks to understand not just the formal political system, such as political parties and elected officials, but also the informal systems of political influence, such as ethnic groups and other centers of power. Most groups hold power only because the population accepts that power distribution. States with deep political divisions are vulnerable to subversion.
There is a connection between the political variable and the social variable. For example, a tribal grouping or a social caste may directly affect whom that group sees as a legitimate authority in an area. Moreover, these social groupings can affect the formal power structure.

Understanding the political variable allows the U.S. to leverage existing power. Wedges can be driven between political actors to weaken opposition to U.S. objectives, and coalitions can be encouraged to strengthen those actors more aligned with U.S. objectives. Future leaders will come from within the power structure, and they can be shaped or culled by U.S. action.

Military. The military variable includes the military and paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors in a given operational environment, not just those of the subject country. There also can be informal groupings of military power. For example, local gangs, armed militias, and private security agents can be factors in local areas.

The subject state’s inability to maintain external and internal security makes it vulnerable to subversion. Within the subject state, there may be regular, elite, militia, paramilitary, tribal, and internal security forces. Transnational criminal organizations may have security forces and may facilitate cross-border flows of all kinds.

External state powers, in addition to having regular militaries, may have special operations forces and paramilitary forces to bring to bear in political warfare. And they may be able to co-opt or coerce non-state proxy forces.

For many countries, the army’s predominant purpose is to be the military force responsible for maintaining external security. However, many militaries become involved in internal security and even governance. The interaction between the military and the political structure is important to understanding this variable’s relationship with the political distribution of power in a society.

The U.S. will be entering into a competition with other external powers over the various military powers in the operational environment. The competing external powers may offer sanctuary, advice, equipment, training, leadership, and funding. By understanding the military variable, the U.S. can more effectively compete for proxy forces.
Economic. The economic variable encompasses individual and group behaviors related to gaining access to, producing, distributing, and consuming resources. These behaviors determine incentives and disincentives that influence economic decisions.

Typically, an economy is conceptualized as currency, stocks, major commodities, banking, and trade controlled and monitored by the government. However, informal economies, trade, or economic exchange outside state-controlled or money-based transactions may be of equal or greater importance than formal economies in understanding an operational environment. While the world economy continues to grow more interdependent, local economies remain relatively distinct. These differences significantly influence political choices, including individuals’ decisions to support or subvert the existing order.

The economic variable ties into other elements of a society. For example, ownership or control of land and debt indicate something about the power structure within a society. The political and economic variables are tightly coupled.

Of particular importance are the external trade relationships, including energy, between states in and beyond the operational environment. While waging political warfare in the Ukraine, dependence on Russian energy moderated Europe’s response. Where U.S. trade is significant, it may be able to influence the behavior of external state powers that might otherwise be neutral.

The strategist seeks to understand the economic pressure points throughout the operational environment. Support for U.S. objectives can be produced by bolstering economic weakness or by exasperating the weakness. External trading relationships can be exploited by sanctions, blockades, or by applying diplomatic pressure to outside actors overtly through international bodies like the UN or quietly through bilateral relations.

Social. The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an operational environment and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society. A society, i.e., a nation, is defined as a population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common culture, and share a sense of national identity. A society often has a dominant culture and some secondary cultures.
Nationalism is a powerful force. Where the borders of states and nations are not aligned, states are ripe for subversion, for example, Germany’s claim on the Sudetenland and Russia’s claim on eastern Ukraine. Hostile takeover may be welcomed, or at least not opposed, by the people living in the contested territory.

Even where a unifying national identity is present, all U.S. actions must be judged on how they are received by the subject state’s people — the nation. Invasion, forced regime change, and occupation are bound to present an affront to national identity, and the aggressor should expect to face violent and sustained resistance. Where the U.S. is the status quo power, it should use national identity against the aggressor. Where the U.S. is the revisionist power, its actions should be designed to minimize blowback. Public support must be built and maintained to reduce friction in opposition to U.S. objectives.

The U.S. must compete with its opponents for public support. In cases where public support is firmly in favor of the opposition, it may be unwise to enter into the competition. In some cases, imposing costs long term on the opposition may be an acceptable outcome.

Infrastructure. The infrastructure variable is composed of the facilities (plant and equipment), personnel, and services needed for the functioning of a community or society. Societies’ infrastructure needs differ but typically include water, sewage, power, health care, schools, communications, and transportation.

States that cannot provide the infrastructure valued by its people may be vulnerable to subversion. Internal and external actors may provide the desired infrastructure as part of their competition with the subject state’s government. Drug cartels and Islamists have successfully competed in this way and purchased considerable support and freedom of action. In other cases, robust infrastructure may be the prize of subversive action, for example, Crimean port facilities seized by Russia through political warfare.

Strategists conducting political warfare must consider the relationship between infrastructure and the economic and military variables. The competitors’ militaries may all use the subject state’s transportation network that supports commercial and military flows making it a contested resource. It may be degraded, improved, or regulated through checkpoints and interdiction. Elements of
infrastructure may be targets for sabotage and false flag operations.

Information. The information variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The contestants in political warfare use the information system to influence international, regional, national, and local audiences.

The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The information environment is made up of three dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive.

- The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind of the decisionmaker or specific audience and is the dimension where people think, perceive, visualize, and decide.

- The informational dimension is the place where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, and displayed.

- The physical dimension is composed of systems, human beings (including decisionmakers, leaders, and military forces), and supporting infrastructure that enable individuals and organizations to create effects by conducting operations across multiple domains.

The cognitive dimension overlaps with the social variable. Events will be interpreted, and responses calculated, according to the audience’s cultural narrative. U.S. messaging must appeal to the target audience’s values rather than U.S. values.

The informational and physical dimensions overlap with the infrastructure variable and are subject to physical attack, including disruption, destruction, monitoring, manipulation, and deception.

The contest of ideas will take place through the information domain. It provides a valuable open source of intelligence, and it may be exploited for messaging and counter messaging. And it may be attacked to degrade or to deny it to opposing actors.
b. **PREVAILING CONDITIONS FOR NON-STATE ACTORS:**

Funding, recruitment, information, and support variables provide a starting point for characterizing the various non-state actors involved in the operational environment.

Non-state actors may be for or against U.S. objectives or they may be largely neutral. Others may be opportunistic and work for the highest bidder. U.S. actions can be taken to enlist some non-state actors as proxies or to encourage coalitions between those favorably inclined and neutrals. And actions may be taken directly against those non-state actors opposing U.S. interests.

**Funding.** Funding is a critical component for the non-state actor. States have regularized revenue streams that can be directed. Non-state actors have donors including state sponsors, charities, and criminal activities like ransom, illicit drug and human trafficking, and stolen resources like oil and diamonds.

Subversive operations require money to pay for supplies, to hire locals to ambush opposing forces, to buy off government officials, to pay people to conduct reconnaissance for future operations, to recruit new people to the organization, and to buy communications equipment. The more money the non-state actor is able to acquire, the more operations they are able to plan and conduct.

The sources, sinks, and intermediate nodes supporting money flows represent pressure points or choke points that can be exploited. Funding flows can be monitored for intelligence value or for interdiction.

Money is inextricably linked to the systems of recruitment, information, and support, as each system requires money, and the more money non-state actors have, the more they can fund these other systems. Finding the key funding nodes and critical links to the other systems can help intelligence analysts and planners identify systemic vulnerabilities. Identifying the key nodes of the funding system is paramount.

**Recruitment.** The non-state actor requires people to build its network and to conduct operations. Understanding the recruiting system is accomplished through intelligence collection augmented by monitoring the information network to identify potential recruits, their recruiters and handlers, the “underground railroad” that moves them, and
facilities where they train. Actions should be chosen to support or thwart recruitment as suits U.S. objectives.

Recruitment may be fueled by radical ideology found on various websites on the internet. Recruiters act as gatekeepers between potential recruits and operational forces. Recruiters offer an exploitable pressure point. Recruiters may be supported or opposed as suits U.S. objectives. Identifying these gatekeepers, as well as attempting to understand how the overall recruitment system works, is a critical step in the analytical process.

The recruitment system is linked to the other systems as it requires an information system to attract recruits, money to pay recruits and to get them trained, and a support system to sustain them.

**Information.** If there is one system that enables the others, it is information. One of the key technological inventions that has revolutionized the movement of information is the internet. Previously, authoritarian states controlled the media and non-state actors lacked command and control capabilities putting them at a distinct disadvantage when competing against states. The internet, and the tools that ride on it, has given non-state actors powerful tools and bridged that gap. The ability to communicate globally, in real-time, with little expense, and with little trace, has radically enhanced the capabilities of the non-state actor.

But others can exploit the same information systems. The U.S. and its competitors can use the information system for messaging, counter-messaging, and deception. And the information system can be monitored to provide an understanding of the non-state actor’s operating, recruiting, and funding networks.

**Support.** Non-state actors rely on a variety of enablers, including access to arms, munitions, and explosives; movement of forces and supplies; sanctuary inside the subject territory or in a neighboring state; and intelligence. In the end, support is something the non-state actor must have in order to operate.

An on-going requirement for most operations is supplies. These supplies can vary by operation and subversive group, but typically are food and water, ammunition and equipment, consumables and replacement of equipment losses from operations. Perhaps most important is support of the people in the subject area.
Non-state actors require sanctuary or secure bases. Whether it is active support, with locals providing safe havens, or passive support, with locals remaining silent about subversives occupying their neighborhoods, subversives need secure bases to plan and operate.

Non-state actors require weapons specialists, people to act as money handlers to move funds and pay people, people to smuggle people and supplies, people to provide intelligence, and specialists with internet tools. Some expertise can be taught fairly quickly; some of it takes a highly qualified person with experience. Highly qualified specialists are few and become high value targets.

Public support reduces friction for non-state actor’s operations. The non-state actor’s need for support may be the center of gravity. The contest for public support will largely take place in the information domain.

D. ACTIONS IN THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Actions are designed to move the prevailing conditions - with primary focus on the center of gravity - toward U.S. objectives. Over time, the list of variables may change and the value of variables will certainly change. Keeping abreast of current conditions requires constant review.

Rather than decisive victory through overwhelming military force, actions in political warfare are calculated to tip the scales in favor of those actors aligned with U.S. objectives and against opposing actors by imposing costs long term. Those actions include:

Isolate opponents internationally. Actions are taken to isolate U.S. opponents both politically and economically. They may include overt economic sanctions negotiated through the UN, or they may be preferential treatment negotiated quietly through bilateral negotiations. Actions range from “name and shame” disseminated through international media at the low end to naval and air interdiction at the high end.

Divide or unite elements of society. Actions are taken to divide or unite elements of society to tip the scales in favor of those aligned with U.S. objectives largely through messaging. The messaging is not just talk; it is the sum of words and actions and is based on an understanding of the various elements’ value systems. Actions include influence operations disseminated through local media to discredit leaders and organizations, false flag operations, and buying off opportunists.
Tip with intelligence. Local actors will undoubtedly have superior human intelligence, but the U.S. has a great advantage in technical means that can tip the scales in favor of U.S. proxies. Intelligence from technical sources may be exchanged for intelligence from human sources.

Tip the military balance. Political contestants each will have their own motivations and objectives. Some may be in direct opposition but others may share important objectives. U.S. actions should be taken to form coalitions that aggregate military power and to drive wedges between others and even pit them against each other to disaggregate military power. Opportunists without strong political alliances may be bought off.

U.S. actions may include support to proxies by organizing, training, and equipping their military forces. In some cases the U.S. may advise and even lead proxy forces. In other cases, the U.S. may undertake direct actions beyond the will or ability of proxies. To oppose proxies, the U.S. may act to restrict the flow of funding, recruits, forces, supplies, and equipment.

Tip with funding. The U.S. may take actions to restrict funding to opposing proxies or provide funding to supported proxies.

Tip with personnel. Key personnel include weapons specialists, internet and communications specialists, funding sources and handlers, and recruiters. Emerging political and military leaders may be supported, co-opted, or culled. Those key personnel working in opposition to U.S objectives can be neutralized (discredited, killed, captured, turned, or turned in place).

VI. APPLICATION OF U.S. STRATEGY

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Apart from the normal day-to-day political actions by the United States in foreign countries, particular problems of coordination are found in those states where instability exists and potential or actual subversion follows. In waging political warfare, whether offensive or defensive, the U.S. must be prepared to present closely coordinated and integrated actions in which each operational area of U.S. policy represented on the Country Team plans a unique and indispensable part in the attainment of U.S. objectives.
First a deep understanding of the opponent and its methods allows an effective strategy to be developed. U.S. strategy must counter its opponent’s strategy and avoid an excessive focus on the tactics (e.g., terrorism) it employs to achieve its subversive political and psychological goals. As important as capturing and killing high value terrorist targets may be, it is more important to be able to attack the opponent’s strategy.

1. **INTELLIGENCE**

   An adequate intelligence effort in support of U.S. policy and action decisions is vital to the successful achievement of U.S. political warfare objectives. Such an intelligence effort must:

   a. Identify those countries where the threat of subversion – secession, revolution, or indirect aggression – is potential, latent, or incipient.

   b. Appraise the nature and scope of the threat or opportunity, the underlying sources of instability, and the significant factors related thereto.

   c. Provide intelligence estimates and appraisals upon which U.S. courses of action can be planned.

   d. Provide operational intelligence required to execute U.S. plans.

   e. Provide the intelligence needed to appraise the extent to which U.S. political objectives are being achieved.

   Agencies having action responsibilities for political warfare operations will contribute to the U.S. intelligence effort in accordance with their respective roles as set forth in the several National Security Council Directives.

   Abroad, the Chiefs of Mission and Principal Officers are responsible for the coordination of all U.S. activities within their respective areas of assignment. However, acting as the designated representative of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA Station Chief is assigned the specific task of coordinating clandestine intelligence collection.

2. **INFLUENCE**

   A coordinated influence campaign – built on informational or psychological operations – will be an important component in political warfare. Lead agency for
influence operations will be assigned to State or CIA depending on the need for secrecy. An influence campaign will:

(a) Employ informational techniques in support of economic and military efforts to counter the propaganda efforts of state and non-state actors hostile to U.S. interests.

(b) Strengthen local understanding of the U.S. policies and objectives.

(c) In coordination with AID and DOD, as appropriate, assist the preferred state and non-state actors in their psychological operations.

(d) In cooperation with the preferred actors, work to improve distribution of effective informational and educational materials to all areas; produce in collaboration with the preferred actors, such film, radio, TV, and other information materials as will further the effort.

(f) In cooperation with AID and DOD, as appropriate, provide training to preferred actors’ personnel in psychological operations and informational activities.

(g) Provide informational materials to the critical sectors (i.e., youth, labor, student, peasant, and intellectual groups) of the subject population.

(h) Develop and maintain a flow of information to the rest of the world promoting U.S. objectives.

3. STAGES OF POLITICAL WARFARE

The U.S. may be the indirect aggressor (waging unconventional warfare) or it may be the defender of the status quo (countering unconventional warfare). Each instance of political warfare is unique, but the level of intensity at any time may be portrayed in terms of three general conditions:

In Stage I, intensity ranges from circumstances in which subversive activity is only a potential threat, latent or already incipient, to situations in which subversive incidents and activities occur with frequency in an organized pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or periods of uncontrolled subversive activity. The situation may be driven by political or economic grievances from ethnic or linguistic groups, political manipulation by charismatic leaders exploiting the above,
and by efforts to establish an underground and auxiliary perhaps aided by external powers.

In this stage, actions are taken to force political accommodation largely through diplomatic and informational channels. The aggressor state and its opposing external actors emphasize providing advice, organization, training, and equipment to their proxy forces. Actions are also taken to isolate opponents internationally, tip social groupings and militaries toward U.S. advantage, and engage locally for increased human intelligence to understand personalities and networks. Such actions raise costs to both aggressors and defenders making a political solution more attractive.

The preferred outcome in this stage is a political solution on terms favorable to the United States. Failure to reach accommodation may lead to escalation to Stage II.

Stage II, stalemate, is reached when the subversive movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority.

In this stage, the underground is mobilized and external actors increase infiltration. External powers increase efforts to organize, train, and equip indigenous proxy forces. The situation may be characterized by violence, subversion, sabotage, and terrorism or simply positioning of forces.

Resolution in this stage is unlikely. Actions taken in this stage are designed to deescalate to Stage I or escalate to Stage III where resolution might be possible.

Stage III is reached when the situation becomes primarily a confrontation between the organized forces of the established authority and those of the opposition.

At the lower levels of subversive activity (Stage I and II), U.S. operations will consist primarily of training, advising, economic and military assistance, intelligence activities, influence operations. Should the intensity of conflict increase, and units of the indigenous armed forces be committed, the U.S. may also assist and support insurgency or counterinsurgency military operations.

At higher levels of confrontation (Stage III), the commitment of U.S. operational forces may be advised requiring a decision at the highest level of government. If such a determination is made, a further Presidential
decision will be necessary to prescribe the relationships between the U.S. Chief of Mission and the U.S. Military Commander, and their relationship with the Chief of State in the country concerned. Operational command of U.S. Armed Forces so committed will flow from the President and Secretary of Defense through military channels to the designated U.S. Military Commander in the field.

It is of the greatest importance that the situation within a subject country be continually appraised. Therefore programs and operations will be continually reviewed in order that they are precisely responsive to the changing situation. The emphasis to be accorded and the responsibilities assigned in connection therewith should always reflect the nature and intensity of the competition.

Over time, the conflict may escalate and deescalate through the stages. The U.S. should seek to create situations of strength, tip the balance of power, so that resolution can be found at the lowest possible level of conflict (Stage I). If Stage III is reached, political warfare has failed. There will likely be an asymmetry of interests between aggressing and defending external actors. There also will be an asymmetry of costs; the U.S. will almost certainly be projecting power across oceans, while it competitors may benefit from proximity. One or more external powers may decline conventional warfare and significantly alter the nature of the competition.

4. WASHINGTON

The Department of State will, in accordance with its traditional responsibility in the field of foreign affairs, provide policy guidance and coordination of political warfare programs. Such guidance and coordination will be affected through the Chiefs of Mission and Principal Officers overseas and the National Security Council in Washington.

To assure requisite support for the total effort, and to expedite intra-departmental coordination and action, each agency (DOS, DOD, DOT, AID, CIA) will designate an element within its organization to be charged with the responsibility for continuing attention to political warfare activities. These designees will:

a. Assure that political warfare problems and progress receive continuing attention and coordination.

b. Provide to responsible regional and country offices general policy and program guidance together with
the expertise gained from other areas on national security problems.

To achieve an integrated Washington effort, approximating the effort of the Country Team abroad, offices of the departments and agencies concerned with countries facing instability and subversion will meet as required under the chairmanship of the State Department to assist in the coordination of U.S. activities and programs in that country.

If the affairs of a country or region are in crisis, a Task Force may be established, normally under the chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary of State for the region in which the crisis country is located. The Task Force will have at least one senior representative from each of the responsible agencies (DOS, DOD, DOT, AID, CIA).

Interagency efforts in Washington will be coordinated through the National Security Council. The Board for Low-Intensity Conflict* has been established to assure unity of effort and use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in waging all forms of low-intensity conflict, including political warfare.

The functions of the Board are to ensure: proper recognition of the emerging threats and opportunities presented by disintegrative instability and subversion; reflection of such recognition in training, equipment, and doctrine; marshaling of resources to deal with the instability; and development of programs aired at dealing with it. The Board will ensure the development of adequate programs underwriting political warfare in countries and regions specifically assigned to it by the President, and resolve any interdepartmental problems which might impede their implementation. In performing the above functions, the members of the Board will act on behalf of their respective departments and agencies, and will depend for staff support upon their own staffs, and upon such country

* The Board for Low-Intensity Conflict, mandated by Nunn-Cohen legislation in 1987, consists of:
  Military Representative of the President, Chair
  The Attorney General
  Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
  Deputy Secretary of Defense
  Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
  Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
  Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  Administrator, AID
  Director, USIA
or regional interdepartmental Task Forces (normally chaired by a State Department Assistant Secretary) as may be established.

Its primary role in political warfare is formulation of policy enabling the various departments and agencies to prepare, assigning roles and missions to departments and agencies, and putting someone in charge.

The Board will raise issues to the Deputies Committee. The Deputies Committee will assure consistency with national policies, perform a quality assurance function on the work of interagency working groups and task forces, stand up interagency task forces when needed, make recommendations to the Principals Committee, and monitor progress toward political objectives.

5. ABROAD

The Country Team leads in political warfare abroad. In countering unconventional warfare, the subject state’s Country Team will require augmentation. In waging unconventional warfare, diplomatic relations with the subject country likely will be severed at some point. In these cases, a Country Team will be established in a neighboring state, perhaps by augmenting a watch office in an existing mission. In either case, a Chief of Mission, Chief of Station, and Chief Information Officer will be appointed with appropriate authorities.

At the country level, the Chief of Mission* is responsible for overall direction of the Country Team and the coordination of all U.S. programs. As the President’s personal representative, the Chief of Mission will ensure that the U.S. effort is developed and effectively applied through an integrated approach comprising all civilian and military programs employed in attaining U.S. objectives.

The United States will make every effort to determine which countries are most ripe for subversion. Chiefs of Mission in subject countries will make continuing assessments to ensure that threats and opportunities are identified in time to take action. In threatened countries detailed assessments will be made to analyze what basic factors contribute to the instability, the time available for action, and what resources and courses of action are

* In those countries where there is no U.S. Ambassador the responsibility will rest with the Principal U.S. Diplomatic Officer.
necessary. Such assessments will form the basis upon which integrated plans and programs can be developed.

The Chief of Mission in some cases may need outside assistance with those tasks of assessment, planning, and program formulation. In these cases, special interdepartmental assessment and planning teams may be temporarily assigned to work under the Chief of Mission.

Based on the assessment and courses of action required, a Political Warfare Plan (See Annex C for draft outline plan) will be developed by the Country Team. After its submission to Washington for consideration and approval by all departments and agencies concerned, these plans will become the basis for program proposals. In formulating a Political Warfare Plan, the Chief of Mission should consider the full range of assets, both governmental and non-governmental, as well as possible non-American assets, which it would be useful to bring to bear.

B. ROLES AND MISSIONS

Soon after the Second World War, the unconventional warfare mission was assigned to the CIA in peacetime and to the U.S. Army in wartime. The result was that the Army would neglect the capability in peacetime and be unprepared in wartime. It is a purpose of this policy statement to ensure that a political warfare capability is developed and maintained on a permanent basis.

In the early years of the Cold War, Secretary of State George C. Marshall rejected the intelligence role fearing that it would jeopardize the diplomatic mission. And State’s practice of dealing only with recognized state actors inhibits its ability to lead when non-state actors may dominate the landscape. Better suited than State, the CIA maintains contact with foreign governments even when diplomatic relations have been severed and is accustomed to dealing with non-state actors.

The U.S. has many resources that it can apply in political warfare. These resources can only be mobilized and harnessed by the development of realistic integrated plans and programs, and the implementation of a unified concept of operations. This section delineates the role of each responsible agency with respect to political warfare.

1. THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

In its role as principal advisor to the President in the field of foreign affairs and execution of foreign
policy, the Department of State is responsible for providing overall policy guidance and assuring the coordination of political warfare programs.

State’s role is to assure that countries chosen for political warfare and actions taken in offensive or defensive political warfare are consistent with overall U.S. foreign policy objectives. But its capacity to carry out programs is quite limited. Furthermore, its involvement in political warfare may harm the diplomatic mission. The proper role for State is typified by its role in foreign assistance (carried out by AID) and security assistance (carried out by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency), that is, determination of which countries will receive assistance, setting priorities, and assuring consistency with overall U.S. foreign policies, but not to execute programs.

to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the U.S. served thereby.

The State Department will affect continuous supervision and guide the general direction of political warfare efforts through diplomatic, developmental, military, economic, and informational instruments.

In so doing, State Department will:

(a) Assure that disintegrative instability as it arises receives the continuing attention of our friends and allies.

(b) Provide intelligence on foreign political, economic, and socio-cultural developments.

(c) Assure the development of Political Warfare Plans, where required.

(d) Assess in conjunction with other responsible agencies the adequacy of the various U.S. programs which, in the aggregate, constitute the total U.S. political warfare effort in a county.

(e) In collaboration with other United States Intelligence Board agencies keep under constant review the stability situation of all countries in order to identify those where subversion requires particular attention.

(f) Using whatever techniques are feasible, including public opinion research and motivational studies, provide information on political attitudes, the extent and
causes of disaffection and dissidence, and other aspects of opinion relevant to potential or actual subversion.

(g) Participate, with the other agencies involved, in providing training for selected U.S. civilian and military government officials in the field of political warfare.

(h) Through the United Nations and other international organizations, increase global awareness of the threat of indirect aggression inimical to U.S. interests and, as appropriate, organize such field operations as would aid in promoting general U.S. objectives.

(i) Encourage foreign diplomatic, political, economic, psychological, and military support in support of U.S. objectives.

(j) Encourage U.S. private interests (business firms, foundations, etc.) to take action in support of U.S. policy and programs.

2. THE ROLE OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Administrator of AID has primary responsibility for the administration of economic aid programs. AID’s efforts are most beneficial in addressing the conditions leading to subversion and in supporting a friendly government facing an insurgency.

To further U.S. policy objectives directed toward the strengthening of internal defense in countries receiving U.S. assistance, AID will plan and implement programs having as their long-term aim the creation of economic and social conditions of sufficient vitality to eliminate the causes of discontent feeding instability. It also has the responsibility to plan and implement programs responsive to the degree of urgency of the potential or existing threat of subversion which will maximize the capability of civil police to deter or cope with subversive action, to develop and implement civilian counter-insurgency programs, and to support military civic action as appropriate.

Specifically included is the responsibility to:

(a) Plan, develop, and implement civilian programs aimed at strengthening sectors of a society or of geographic areas threatened by subversion or insurgency (e.g., community development, emergency economic
assistance, improvement of communications facilities, road construction, irrigation projects, etc.).

(b) Plan, develop, and implement programs for technical assistance to help strengthen the vulnerable sectors of a society by increasing technical proficiency, broadening skills, and raising the quality of workmanship.

(c) Assess and evaluate the adequacy of those aspects of Internal Defense programs which are the responsibility of the Administrator to develop and implement in exercise of the responsibility delegated under Section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

(d) Promote measures for self-help, where applicable in coordination with DOD, in such areas as the better utilization of resources, reduction of dependence on external resources, better utilization of manpower (including manpower engaged in internal defense), and effectiveness in public administration.

(e) In the mass communications field, where applicable in collaboration with DOD, assist in developing the host government’s capabilities for reaching its citizenry, particularly those segments most vulnerable to subversion, by technical assistance and training, and by supporting worthwhile host government information programs.

(f) Encourage as appropriate expansion of internal assistance from other countries, international organizations, international lending institutions, and private capital sources.

(g) In coordination as appropriate with DOD or CIA provide assistance to:

1. Strengthen the capability of police and police paramilitary organizations to enforce the law and maintain public order with the minimum use of force.

2. Strengthen the capability of police and police paramilitary organizations to counter subversion and insurgency.

3. Encourage the development of responsible and humane police administration and judicial procedure to improve the character and image of police forces, and bind them more closely to the community.

(h) Where appropriate in coordination with DOD or CIA, plan, develop, and implement civilian counter-insurgency programs, such as village alarm systems, village communication systems and remote area aviation liaison.
(i) In collaboration with DOD, plan, develop, and implement military civic action programs on such projects as public works, sanitation, transportation, communications, and education, and assure that such programs are coordinated and properly funded.

3. THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Department of Defense has a major responsibility for assisting selected state and non-state actors engaged in political warfare. Special warfare, the military role in political warfare, comprises unconventional warfare, counter-unconventional warfare, and surgical strike. Actions are taken to shift the military balance in favor of selected U.S. proxy forces.

Where subversive insurgency is virtually non-existent, or incipient (Stage I), the objective is to support the development of an adequate capability in indigenous military forces. When aid is overt, capability development will take place through the Security Cooperation Program and complement the programs of AID with military civic action designed to obtain the support or neutrality of the various segments of society. When the need for secrecy is greater, the CIA will lead with DOD supporting in organizing, training, equipping, and advising selected proxy forces. The same means, in collaboration with AID and CIA, will be employed to develop a similar capability in indigenous paramilitary forces.

When conflict escalates to serious proportions (Stages II or III), the task of U.S. Forces may become operational. The Department of Defense, when directed by the President, will provide operational assistance in the form of U.S. Armed Forces units in support of indigenous forces to provide increased land/sea/air mobility, provide increased land/sea/air interdiction, strikes and raids, additional communications facilities, training assistance, and advice on the conduct of operations.

In fulfilling its special warfare role, the Department of Defense will:

(a) Develop U.S. military forces trained for employment in unconventional warfare, counter-unconventional warfare, and other military guerilla-warfare operations.

(b) Develop, test, and maintain transportation, communications, and logistic systems to support these
forces, and be prepared to provide logistic support to indigenous forces in remote, contested areas.

(c) Develop military doctrine for special warfare operations to provide guidance for the employment of U.S. forces and for the training of U.S. and friendly foreign military personnel.

(d) Develop strategy and prepare contingency plans, in accordance with U.S. foreign policy objectives and commitments, to provide operational assistance or reinforcement with U.S. tactical units to friendly state and non-state actors.

(e) Provide research and development activities in support of special warfare operations.

(f) Conduct military intelligence operations to provide intelligence on foreign military and paramilitary forces.

(g) Be prepared to execute military operations in support of national objectives as directed, including land/sea/air interdiction and strikes and raids in support of proxy forces.

(h) Plan, develop, and implement civilian unconventional and counter-unconventional warfare programs where appropriate with AID and CIA.

(i) Assess the adequacy of its part of the overall political warfare program in relation to those of other U.S. agencies.

(j) Develop language-capable and area-oriented U.S. forces for possible employment in training or providing operational advice or operational support to indigenous forces.

(k) Provide, in coordination with other interested governmental agencies, training and advisory assistance in all aspects of military intelligence.

(l) Maintain continuous surveillance of foreign military and paramilitary forces potentially available for political warfare, evaluating their state of effectiveness and readiness, and making appropriate recommendations for their support and improvement or for their subversion.

(m) Develop the military sections of Country Political Warfare Plans.

(n) Support the psychological operations of CIA in political warfare situations.
Through the Military Assistance Program the Department of Defense will:

(a) Provide, in collaboration with AID, military weapons and material within available resources to friendly indigenous military and paramilitary forces and training in the fields of guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and counterinsurgency.

(b) Encourage and support, in collaboration with AID where appropriate, the use of indigenous military and paramilitary forces of vulnerable states in military civic action programs, including such projects as public works, sanitation, transportation, communications, and other activities helpful to economic development.

4. THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

The Treasury Department and its Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has an important role to play in monitoring and, when appropriate, interdicting money flows that support non-state actors whose actions are inimical to U.S. interests. Intelligence thus gained will be provided to interagency partners.

5. THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The political warfare role of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Director of National Intelligence will be carried out in accordance with the provisions of statutory authority and executive direction.

The Director of National Intelligence will assure proper resource allocation across the Intelligence Community to support national Political Warfare Plans.

The CIA is an active participant in the planning and execution of the U.S. political warfare effort at both the national and Country Team levels. Accordingly, it will:

(a) Encourage formation of coalitions of state and non-state actors and coordinated action toward common objectives.

(b) Provide, in collaboration with DOD where appropriate, funding, training, equipment, and advice to proxy military and paramilitary forces.

(c) Formulate and conduct, with DOD where appropriate, influence (psychological or informational) operations. DOD components include, but are not limited to,

(d) With DOD where appropriate, plan and conduct false flag operations and support pseudo operations.

(e) Plan and conduct interventions into foreign political processes.
ANNEX A: GLOSSARY OF TERMS

CLANDESTINE OPERATION – Activities to accomplish intelligence, counter-intelligence, and other similar activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.

COLD WAR – A state of international tension, wherein political, economic, technological, sociological, psychological, paramilitary, and military measures short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces are employed to achieve national objectives.

COUNTERGUERRILLA WARFARE – Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or non-military agencies of a government against guerrillas.

COUNTERINSURGENCY – Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE – That aspect of intelligence activity which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installations or material against sabotage.

COVERT OPERATIONS – Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation.

EVASION AND ESCAPE (E&E) – The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control.

FALSE FLAG OPERATIONS – Actions conducted by one entity to be attributed to another, typically to drive wedges, discredit, or incite a strong response.

GUERRILLA – A combat participant in guerrilla warfare.

GUERRILLA WARFARE (GW) – Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.
INSURGENCY - A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily Islamist inspired, supported, or exploited.

INTERNAL DEFENSE - The full range of measures taken by a government to protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

INTERNAL SECURITY - The state of law and order prevailing within a nation.

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION - The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.)

NATION - A people with a shared identity based on some mix of history, culture, language, and religion. Most importantly, agreement on the rules of normative behavior.

PARAMILITARY FORCES - Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission.

PARAMILITARY OPERATION - An operation undertaken by a paramilitary force.

PROPAGANDA - Any information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals in support of national objectives, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.

BLACK - Propaganda which purports to emanate from a source other than the true one.

GREY - Propaganda which does not specifically identify any source.

WHITE - Propaganda disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency thereof.

POLITICAL WARFARE - All means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives, including but not limited to influence operations (psychological
operations), political action, economic sanctions, and coercive diplomacy.

PESEUDO OPERATIONS - Operations in which government forces and guerrilla defectors portray themselves as insurgent units. Pseudo teams can provide critical human intelligence and other support to these operations.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE - The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

RADICAL - An extreme negative reaction to the status quo favoring overthrow of the current system and replacing it with an unproven system.

REACTIONARY - An extreme negative reaction to progress and modernization favoring a return to a past system thought to be preferable.

REMOTE AREA OPERATIONS - Operations undertaken in insurgent-controlled or contested areas to establish islands of popular support for the host nation government and deny support to the insurgents. They differ from consolidation operations in that they are not designed to establish permanent host nation government control over the area.

Remote areas may be populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated minority groups. They may be in the interior of the host nation or near border areas where major infiltration routes exist.

Remote area operations normally involve the use of specially trained paramilitary or irregular forces. Special Forces teams support remote area operations to interdict insurgent activity, destroy insurgent base areas in the remote area, and demonstrate that the host nation government has no conceded control to the insurgents. They also collect and report information concerning insurgent intentions in more populated areas. In this case, Special Forces teams advise and assist irregular host nation forces operating in a manner similar to the insurgents themselves, but with access to superior combat support and combat service support resources.

SPECIAL WARFARE - The execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency
in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment. Special warfare includes unconventional warfare and counter-unconventional warfare.

STATE - A political entity with borders and institutions to secure and serve the nation.

SUBVERSION - Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength of a regime.

SURGICAL STRIKE - The execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence adversaries and threats.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE - Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.
ANNEX B: MODEL OUTLINE OF POLITICAL WARFARE PLAN

I. BACKGROUND
   A. Resumé of US-subject country relations.
   B. Strategic importance to U.S.
   C. Economic and social conditions prevailing.
   D. Past, present and future threats to internal stability.
   E. Orientation of foreign policy and relations with neighboring states.
   F. External threats.

II. DEFINITIVE STATEMENT OF SUBJECT COUNTRY’S VULNERABILITIES
   A. Political.
   B. Socio-economic.
   C. Security (police, military and paramilitary) and intelligence.
   D. Psychological information.

III. POLICY AND OBJECTIVES
   A. Statement of overall U.S. policy and objectives for subject country in context of I and II above.
   B. Identify and explain any recommended changes to be made to approved objectives.

IV. COURSE OF ACTION
   List under the following headings the lines of action required on the part of the subject country, the U.S. and third countries and/or international organization necessary to attain U.S. objectives:
   A. Political.
   B. Socio-economic.
   C. Security (including intelligence).
   D. Psychological information.

V. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
   For a 5-year projection (i.e. FY-15-20) summarize plan and program resource requirements for the subject country, the U.S. and third countries and/or international
organizations. Employ the following system of categorization and relate program elements to lines of action contained in Section IV.

A. Socio-economic programs - List program totals and major projects for the following:
   1. Long-range development (little immediate impact).
   2. Short-range projects such as:
      - Community development.
      - Credit.
      - Housing.
      - Labor.
      - Health and sanitation.
      - Road construction.
      - Food.
      - Information.
      - Education.

B. Civic action (military, paramilitary and police).
   1. Employ same categories as for socio-economic programs

C. Security programs
   1. Police and paramilitary.
      (a) Equipment
      (b) In-country advisory assistance.
      (c) Participant training.
   2. Military (by service).
      (a) Equipment and material.
      (b) In-country advisory assistance.
      (c) Formal training.
   3. Other

D. Psychological/information.
   1. Mass media, including technical assistance.
   2. Cultural exchange.
   3. Libraries

VI. APPENDICES
   A. Listing of U.S. resources available for application in subject, - i.e., U.S. Corps of Engineers capabilities, Peace Corps, Ford Foundation-type operations, special forces augmentation teams, etc.
   B. Additional non-USG programs and activities.